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But some mechanism would eventually have been created to limit the im-
possibly growing work load even if the Court had been forced to improvise
without legislation, and certainly the Supreme Court's decisions upholding
New Deal legislation found their real inspiration in Marshall's views on federal
power, in the urgent economic necessities of the 1930's and in the changes in
the Court's membership.
Despite the absence of original material, this is a worthwhile book to have
and to use. It is well written, less discursive (though less original) than Prin-
gle's; it brings up to date the additional materials and puts them in a single
readable volume. Some chapters, such as that on judicial reform, discuss as-
pects of Taft's work more coherently than have been done elsewhere. The
numerous quotations from Taft and others are illuminating rather than dis-
tracting. The book gives us another look behind the judicial curtain with the
aid of that dreaded modem weapon, intra-court memoranda, as well as of
the uninhibited private correspondence between the Chief Justice and his rela-
tives. As Matthew Josephson wrote of Pringle's biography, Mason's "attitude
toward the hero is a mixture of decent sympathy and pained critical disap-
proval."60 With the added knowledge of the years, Mason quite properly shows
less of the first quality and more of the second. Mason's words may not be
harsh but the resulting portrait is merciless. The reader is left with melancholy
in the reminder that well-meaning men often make up that "blind" Court 0 1
of which Taft himself wrote, that our governmental masters are usually not
great men, and that under their guidance each age finds new devils to exorcise.
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THESE studies of the political ideals of Liberty and Equality may serve to
remind us, in the first place, of the unfortunate decline of the third ideal of the
French Revolution. Political philosophies appear to be unacquainted with the
ideal of Fraternity, and practical politicians, at once cynical and mawkish, pre-
fer to invoke the unavailable powers of Love. The memorable modern con-
siderations of the notion of fraternity - Dostoyevsky's, Freud's, Malraux's -
are not philosophical in manner, nor are they designed to enforce fraternity as
a political ideal. Freud's totemic brotherhood confronts the ideal of fraternity
with the impulse to fratricide, and the Illusha brotherhood inspired by Alyosha
Karamazov is pointedly extra-political. Malraux may seem to provide an ex-
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ception. But the "virile" fraternity displayed by the retreating troops in Les
Noyers de l'Altenburg and by Kyo and Katov in La condition Hunaine is not
to the point. These actions are only incidentally political, and judged politically
they represent defeats. Their triumphant nature can only be grasped when it is
understood that they are in fact revolts against the human condition. But the
Absurd is not a political condition and the means of transcending it do not
define the ends of politics. It is a misfortune that contemporary scholarship has
failed to investigate the decline of fraternity as a political ideal, even as it is a
misfortune that contemporary political thought has allowed the idea to become
the possession of a few sectarian Socialist Writers.
The other ideals of the French Revolution remain at the center of our
rhetoric and our politics. The rhetoric has been corrupted and the ideals often
enough violated: we need only remind ourselves of Orwell's slogans, "Freedom
is slavery," and "All animals are equal, but some are more equal than others,"
to recognize that. But this is only another confirmation of La Rochefoucauld's
maxim, Hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue. Despite their inter-
mittent debasement, these ideals have a discernible meaning, a distinguished
history, and a permanent validity. It is the merit of the books under discussion
that they contribute to our understanding of these characteristics. Mr. Lakoff's
book is a sustained and valuable history of the idea of equality in political
philosophy, unfortunately marred by its analytic confusions and often proleptic
readings. Mr. Spitz's more modest volume is a useful, although highly miscel-
laneous, collection of essays in explanation and defense of "the liberal idea of
freedom." It is philosophically stronger (and less pretentious) than Lakoff's
book. But most of the essays are too short, some of them trivially so. A little
over a page is devoted to Frank Lloyd Wright, and in it we are treated to a
characteristically unbuttoned observation: "architects, when they discourse
politically, tend to form a community of aversion to 'the mob'." (From this
we glean that Spitz has also read Ralph Adams Cram, but not much else.)
Then, too, the quality of the views under discussion varies so violently (Mon-
tesquieu and Barry Goldwater, Santayana and Walter Berns) that Spitz does
not seem able to sustain a consistent level of discussion. Nevertheless, these
books represent in a respectable way the sort of work done by the teachers of
political theory in the political science departments of our colleges and univer-
sities. They are to be admired for holding out against the vulgar inanities of
much "behavioral" science and against the unfortunate neglect of politicall
theory by a generation of philosophers. But their position is anomalous and
their future uncertain. For they do not submit themselves to the disciplines of
history or of philosophy, and their work is not quite satisfactory either as
theory or as history of ideas.
Lakoff professes to isolate and study the Liberal, the Conservative, and the
Socialist concepts of equality. Unfortunately, he is unclear about the nature of
concepts and refers indifferently to concepts, definitions, views, doctrines, and
principles. These are, however, very different things, and it does not follow
from the fact that different traditions have different views of equality that they
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have different definitions or concepts of it. Thus, it does not follow from the
fact that Nietzsche (whom Lakoff dubiously regards as a Conservative) de-
plores the equalitarianism espoused in the French Declaration of Rights that
Nietzsche and the French revolutionaries have a different concept of equality.
On the contrary, the natural presumption must be that they have the same con-
cept, and Lakoff nowhere rebuts such presumptions. If it is unclear that dif-
ferent concepts characterize the various traditions it is equally unclear that
single concepts characterize any of them. Liberalism (as Spitz not implausibly
sees it) is committed to both equality of citizenship and to equality of oppor-
tunity. The Conservative tradition is suspicious not only of an equality of
rights but also of an equality of conditions. It is fundamental to Marxian so-
cialism to regard both the equality of rights and of opportunities as bourgeois
illusions, while socialists as various as the Utopians mad the Fabians have been
committed to achieving such different ends as the equality of incomes and of
human dignity. Lakoff has failed, then, either to make plain what a concept of
equality is, or to show that particular concepts of equality are peculiar to the
different political traditions. These failures inevitably affect the value of his
historical and philosophical investigations (one keeps wondering what Lovejoy
might have done with this subject), and they quite invalidate his patronizing
reflection of the work of Sir Isaiah Berlin. Indeed, if Lakoff had understood
Berlin's illuminating essay on equality he might have avoided many of the
errors in question.
The distinguished historian of Liberalism, Ruggiero, argued, I think correct-
ly, that the Liberal tradition is committed both to "the idea of equality" and
also to "the feeling of liberty." Spitz, as we have seen, supposes Liberalism to
be committed to equality of citizenship and of opportunity, but also, we must
now add, to "the liberal idea of freedom." He speaks in one place of liberty as
literally requiring "an absence of chains." In this he is surely wrong for, unless
"chains" is understood metaphorically, such a conception is far too restricted
for even the most puristic liberals. In fact, however, Spitz habitually regards
"chains" as a trope for "restraints." And, indeed, the liberal tradition has come
to hold - with what justice we cannot discuss here - that not only physical
inhibitions and legal prohibitions, but also various forms of economic, and even
psychological, duress are fairly regarded as "restraints." He is, furthermore,
inclined to argue that legal restraints on these non-legal restraints may favor
the interests of liberty. To be sure, for instance, the anti-trust laws abridge the
freedom to enter into price-fixing agreements. But it may be claimed that in
restraining agreements "in restraint of trade" the laws secure, among other
things, an important freedom of choice for the buyer. If this argument is ac-
ceptable, it may be maintained that an increase in governmental legislation may
not - as so many suppose - be inimical to the interests of freedom. Indeed,
it may be held to foster them. Spitz's line of argument leads one to ask how
far the legislation of the modem welfare state is susceptible of such a liber-
tarian interpretation. Unfortunately, no serious analysis of the question is at-
tempted, and we are left wondering precisely what relations in fact obtain be-
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tween the interests in liberty and equality as they manifest themselves in the
contemporary political arena.
Spitz's notion of liberty as the absence of restraints derives from the British
empirical tradition. Hobbes, Bentham, and Mill employ it, and it is what Ber-
lin means by "negative" freedom. A number of Spitz's best essays are critiques
of writers, for example, Harold Laski, who confuse liberty with quite different
conceptions such as happiness, or who confuse "negative" liberty with more
"positive" conceptions of it. Spitz's objection to positive notions of freedom is
familiar enough. They imply that persons are free when the plain fact is that
they have been constrained or coerced in the name of law, reason, nature or
virtue. Montesquieu declares, for instance, that liberty is the right of doing
what the law permits. But, as Bertrand Russell has objected, after the Revoca-
tion of the Edict of Nantes doing what the law permitted did not make the
French Protestants free. If Spitz is unwilling to have liberty abridged con-
ceptually, he is equally concerned that it not be abridged on openly illiberal
grounds. He is, therefore, properly and effectively appalled by the egregious
suggestion made in Walter Berns' Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment.
Our entire tradition would be undermined if we followed the epigone of the
school of Professor Leo Strauss in his suggestion that the First Amendment
be understood to guarantee that "Congress shall make no law abridging the
freedom of good speech." But Spitz brings the quality of his own mind into
question when he sees Berns as representative of such figures as "Walter Lipp-
mann, Eric Voegelin and John Hallowell, Bertrand de Jouvenel and, to a lesser
degree, Hannah Arendt." It is one thing to depart from the tradition of liberal-
ism that Spitz somewhat provincially sees as running from Mill to R. M. Mac
Iver, Bertrand Russell, and Morris R. Cohen, and another to embrace the
cabalistic "conservatism" of Professor Strauss. Spitz is a valuable critic of
Republican Party apologists and Sunday Times ideologists. But his essays oil
the profounder critics of liberalism, whether Conservative (as in the essays on
Santayana or Hannah Arendt) or Socialist ("Why Communists Are Not of
the Left") are often partisan and perfunctory.
Spitz is concerned to deny that there is, as Lakoff alleges, a "crisis in liberal-
ism." (Nor does Lakoff fail to produce those other freshman course show-
stoppers "the conservative paradox," and "the socialist dilemma.") And it is
an unusual merit of Spitz's discussion not to confuse the contention that the
liberal states are in some political crisis with the claim that there is a theoretical
difficulty in the principles of liberalism. Every serious political thinker has, of
course, attempted to set some limits to the exercise of freedom. One has only
to mention (in order of increasing plausibility) that Spencer proposed to for-
bid actions that prevent others from doing the same sort of act, and that Kant
wished to prohibit those actions that infringed the freedom of others. Mill, the
most satisfactory of the classical philosophers on this problem, maintained that
society might restrain actions if they are neither self-regarding (i.e., if they (10
not harm others) nor, altogether other-regarding, such that it would not ad-
vance the general good to forbid them. It is Spitz's contention that liberalism
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is not committed to guaranteeing any particular freedoms (except the freedom
of speech that Berns would abridge). And he claims that liberalism is nothing
more than a method for settling the conflicting claims of freedom and con-
straint. This method he judges to be the method of rational inquiry. That
liberalism is not simply a method but has always undertaken to make certain
substantive determinations is, however, plain both from the history of liberal
states and from the attempts of liberals to formulate principles such as the ones
mentioned above. A commitment to rational method independent of any com-
mitment to principles of liberty or equality, utility or the common good, would
be quite incompetent to settle the conflicts Spitz has in mind. Nor has the
liberal tradition ever attempted so empty an exercise. Spitz's identification of
liberalism with rational method is designed, I take it, to confound the charge
of "crisis," but it is misleading and arrogant - misleading because it suggests
that the only critics of liberalism are critics of rational method, and arrogant
in maintaining that to be a critic of liberalism is necessarily to be an irrational-
ist. "From this standpoint" Spitz writes, "conservatives who look to a body of
principles allegedly embodied in some remote past and utopian radicals who
look to a body of principles contained in some blueprint of the future are alike
fanatical men." This may be comforting, but it is surely an inadequate view of
the historical repertoire.
Spitz does not, of course, consistently adhere to his untenable identification
of liberalism with rational method. Indeed, he habitually, and properly, allows
that liberalism is committed to particular liberties and, indeed, to certain equal-
ities. He is even willing to consider the Conservative allegation - familiar from
Donoso Cortes and Tocqueville, from Nietzsche and the anti-civil rights ideol-
ogists - that Liberty and Equality are incompatible political ideals. This sup-
posed dilemma cannot, of course, be discussed profitably in so abstract a form,
or disposed of, as Lakoff cavalierly does, by dismissing "those mock philoso-
phers who claim that equal rights contradict individual liberties." It is plain
that the enforcement of equal rights for the Negro will, in fact, limit the free-
dom of white citizens to associate on whatever terms they please. And the at-
tempt of legislatures a generation ago to equalize the bargaining positions of
labor and management did in fact lead them to abridge the freedom to contract.
The attempt to equalize rights or conditions may (to follow Lakoff's Hegelian
usage) "contradict" the exercise of certain individual liberties. In this sense
there are possible conflicts between Liberty and Equality. There is no need to
deny this as Lakoff does. Far better to admit the conflict and make the choices
required. But if there are possible conflicts between Liberty and Equality then
it is also the case that securing the one is often simply a question of securing
the other. Some of the pertinent inequalities are inequalities of liberty. Winning
equality for women, and for Negroes, has, to a large extent, meant nothing
other than freeing them from certain legal and political restraints, and con-
ferring upon them certain legal options and political freedoms. Indeed, Richard
Wollheim has gone so far as to argue that the Liberty liberalism seeks is sim-
ply an Equality of Rights. Whether Liberty and Equality are, indeed, the
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David and Jonathan of political philosophy may be doubted. But neither are
they as conservatives suggest (in Tawney's phrase) its Cain and Abel.
In the final analysis, it is the Socialist, rather than the Conservative, critique
that is most damaging to Liberalism. One need not be a Marxist to see the
truth in Marx's observation that equal rights guarantee the right to be unequal.
Indeed, liberals like Spitz frankly recommend the liberal commitment to equal-
ity of opportunity as "the necessary and proper condition for the discovery of
whatever inherent inequalities may exist among men." Marx's rejection of such
a programme in favor of one in which men's admitted inequalities are mitigated
by "unequal" rights rather than made manifest by "equal" ones need not con-
cern us here. But the criticisms of historical liberalism made by such socialists
as R. H. Tawney and Michael Young are very much to the point. The liberal
object of revealing natural inequalities requires, in Tawney's words, "not only
an open road but an equal start," and it may issue as Young has indicated, in
a meritocracy with features as obnoxious as those of any other class system.
Historical liberalism (perhaps bemused by visions of a Lockean state of nature
in which equal liberty prevails) has so-far failed to guarantee that equal start.
If the fathers are to be rewarded for the distance they can make it down the
road how are the sons to be given an equal start? This is one manifestation of
the "liberal crisis" that Lakoff never quite formulates and Spitz never quite
faces.
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